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Goutras: Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Within Bankruptcy Reorganization

THE REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENTS WITHIN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION:
RECONCILING A LEGISLATIVE DILEMMA

INTRODUCTION

1981, a Dallas based conglomerate, LTV Corporation, spun-off a subsidiary known as Wilson Foods.' The purpose for this action was that
Wilson Foods, the nation's fifth largest meat packer was suffering from financial
difficulties. Shortly after the spin-off, Wilson Foods entered into a collective
2
bargaining agreement with its unionized employees, initiating a wage freeze
through 1985. Under this arrangement, Wilson Foods' losses continued to
escalate.I
N

On April 22, 1983, Wilson Foods sought protection from its creditors pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA)." Though
by no means insolvent,' Wilson feared that escalating losses would jeopardize
its credit line.6 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Kenneth J. Griggy stated,
"this was the only way [the company] could survive." 7
Under Chapter 11 Wilson was given protection from litigation, creditors,
and contractual obligations.' Wilson Foods believed that its collective bargaining
agreement with the United Food and Commercial Workers Union was the cause
of its financial troubles. 9 Therefore, pursuant to statutory authority of the
BRA,' 0 Wilson unilaterally rejected the collective bargaining agreement of 1981.
'Sorenson, Chapter 11 Filing by Wilson Foods Roils Workers' Lives, Tests Law, Wall St. J.,May 23,
1983 at 37, col. 2.
2

1d.

'Id. See, Wall St. J., April 25, 1983 at 16, col. 2.
'11 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1982).
'Winans, Some Say Wilson FoodsResults May Rebound in Fiscal '84 if Court Upholds Sharp Wage Cuts,
Wall St. J.,May 3, 1983 at 59, col. 2. (Financial analyst William Leach of Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette
estimates the company's book value at sixty million dollars). See, Wall St. J., April 25, 1983 at 16, col.
2. (Wilson Foods Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Kenneth J. Griggy "noted that Wilson has
'sufficient' cash * * * and a sixty million dollar revolving credit line to meet its needs." Id.
'Sorenson, supra note 1.
7Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
'Sorenson, supra note 1; Barmash, Wilson Foods in Chapter 11 Filing, Wall St. J.,April 23, 1983 at 29,
col. 3. See, Winans, Some Say Wilson Foods Results May Rebound in Fiscal '84 if Court Upholds Sharp
Wage Cuts, Wall St. J., May 3, 1983 at 59, col. 2. (The forty percent reduction in wages is predicted
to result in savings of between seventy to one hundred million dollars).
11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
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On April 22, unionized workers went to work believing they were being
paid $10.69 per hour. That afternoon a radio broadcast announced Wilson
Foods had unilaterally rejected the 1981 wage freeze and was now paying its
unionized workers only $6.50 per hour."I This forty percent reduction in pay
raised both economic and legal concerns among the union and the 6200
12
unionized workers at Wilson Foods.

To the unionzed workers' shock and dismay, they found that the BRA,
like its predecessor the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act), I3 permitted the unilateral

rejection of executory contracts. Furthermore, except for one specific statutory
exception,' appellate courts had held that collective bargaining agreements,
16
5
were executory contracts within the Act and the BRA.
Wilson Foods was not the first nor the most recent company to seek
bankruptcy court relief from its collective bargaining agreements.II Wilson Foods
represents but one example of the many companies which have recently sought
refuge in bankruptcy court from their collective bargaining agreements.' 8
The case of Wilson Foods demonstrates a legislative dilemma which has

existed for over half a century. ' The dilemma is that whereas the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits the unilateral rejection of collective
bargaining agreements, 20 the Bankruptcy Laws permit such action. 21 Why a

situation which has existed for so long should just recently raise such heightened
congressional and public concern22 may be "perhaps because more and more
marginal businesses now find the Chapter 11 refuge a practical alternative ' 2 3
to wage concessions.
The legislatively created dilemma between the Bankruptcy Laws and the
"Sorenson, supra note 1.
"Id. The economic concern is that as wages had risen, so too had the union worker's standard of living,
which included mortgage payments.
"130 Stat. 544-565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 1-1080 (Superseded).
"1 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982), Collective bargaining agreements subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq.) may not be unilaterally terminated or modified by the trustee.
"Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.,
519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
"In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (1 1th Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1982) aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
"Smith and Pulliam, Congress Wrote Continental's Ticket, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1983 at 30, col. 2.
"See Id.
"In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
2029 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See also, note 32 infra.
"The term, "Bankruptcy Laws" will refer to both the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, collectively.
21605 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1299 at 3 (Oct. 14, 1983). Congressman George Miller of the House
Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations said that the practice of avoiding collective bargaining
agreements through bankruptcy proceedings "is one of the most critical problems in the field of labor
relations in the last thirty years." Id.
"Smith and Pulliam, supra note 17.
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NLRA is the basis of this comment. Though the dilemma exists equally under
liquidation,24 this comment will deal exclusively with the problem under
reorganization.25 Part I will deal with the relevant legislation. Part II will analyze
how the limited number of federal circuit courts have confronted the conflict.
Part III will look at various "tests" formulated by the circuits in determining
if rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should be permitted in a given
situation. In Part IV this comment will analyze how the United States Supreme
Court has recently attempted to resolve the legislative dilemma.26 It will conclude with the issue of how Congress can and should initiate legislative reform
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision.
Whether the Supreme Court's decision will be the final word upon these
issues is not yet certain. 27 Various legislators have stated that they "would introduce legislation to assure the 'fairness and equity' of our industrial relations
system, if it was determined that the use of the Bankruptcy Laws undermines
our labor statutes." 2 Therefore, regardless of how the Supreme Court has
recently ruled, this comment will demonstrate where Congress and the courts
have failed, and how the present dilemma can be rectified. Furthermore, this
comment demonstrates that a potential for abuse exists and that judicial scrutiny
is necessary to minimize abuse.
I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE DILEMMA

A. The Labor Law
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 9
"to promote industrial peace by facilitating collective bargaining and to reduce
the disparity in bargaining power between employers and employees." 3
Congress believed that industrial peace would result in enhanced commerce
which in turn would benefit both management and labor."
To achieve the stated purpose of the NLRA, Congress enacted procedural
requirements32 which granted to collective bargaining agreements a favored and
2411 U.S.C. § 700 (1982). The author does not believe that the Bankruptcy Laws under liquidation are

in any way used to avoid collective bargaining agreements due to the severity of the results. If liquidation
was used solely for this purpose one could say the debtor was cutting off his nose to spite his face.
2111 U.S.C. § 1100-1174 (1982).
"In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
"See, Interim Report Urges Action on Bankruptcy Reform, 20 TRIAL 12, 13 (1984). "The need (for reform)
is highlighted by cases such as Braniff, Manville, Wilson Foods, Baldwin-United and Continental, involving
billions of dollars, tens of thousands of employees, and thousands of stockholders." Id.
21605 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1299 at 3 (Oct. 14, 1983).
2929 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
10S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1935).
"C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW (1946).
229 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982):
... no party to a [collective bargaining agreement] shall terminate or modify [the agreement] unless
the party desiring [the] termination or modification:
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract...
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract
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protected status not common to contracts in general. The NLRA did not
absolutely preclude any termination or modification of collective bargaining
agreements. It merely required that certain procedures be followed before a
collective bargaining agreement could be terminated or modified.
An important mandate of the NLRA is that neither party to a collective
bargaining agreement may unilaterally reject or modify the agreement." This
Law which does
mandate is in complete conflict with the present Bankruptcy
34
contract.
executory
any
of
rejection
unilateral
permit the
The collective bargaining agreement's favored status and protection under
the NLRA explains why such contracts are considered "extraordinary" by
organized labor. This favored status has been the basis of organized labor's
futile argument35 that collective bargaining agreements should not be treated
as ordinary executory contracts within the Bankruptcy Laws. Unfortunately,
36
labor's argument, to its dismay, has not succeeded.
B. The Bankruptcy Laws
Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, "in most of the
American Colonies, the administration of the debtor's estate followed more
or less the English Common Law."" Under the English Common Law, the
primary goal of bankruptcy legislation was to aid the creditor by affording
38
him the opportunity to be made whole. During this period there were no
reorganization provisions whereby the debtor was protected in order to
rehabilitate himself and survive financially. The English Law instead, "preceeded
upon the assumption that the debtor was necessarily to be dealt with as an
9
offender" who was worthy of punishment."
Due to the American Revolution there was a disruption of commerce which
0
resulted in widespread bankruptcy and the resulting oppression of debtors.
or a contract containing the proposed modificiations;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service... and any State or Territorial
Agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory... ;
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, allthe terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later. Id.
"Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV.391 (1981).
the trustee, subject to the court's approval may assume or reject any executory contract ...
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
'5Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd,
519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). The district court agreed with organized labor and held that the bankruptcy
court had no authority to relieve a debtor-in-possession of the requirements of a collective bargaining
agreement, in that such was not an executory contract within the scope of § 313(1); (former analogous
section to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982)).
"See generally cases cited supra notes 15 and 16.
"A. NAMDAR, CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY,§ 1.2 at 6 (1977).
'"...

"Id., § 1.2 at 5.
"Continental Illinois National Bank & Title Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935).
40A. NAMDAR,supra note 37.
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In order to alleviate present and future oppression, Congress, pursuant to Constitutional authority" enacted various short-lived bankruptcy acts' 2 which dealt
exclusively with liquidation.
With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act),"3 the concept
of reorganization began to emerge." Like its predecessors though, the Act's
primary relief was liquidation and not reorganization.' In 1938, with the enactment of the Chandler Act,4" reorganization was finally made available to all
corporate entities and became a major element of bankruptcy relief.
The Bankruptcy Laws evolved significantly from the concepts and objectives of the English Common Law. Under the Bankruptcy Laws, rather than
being punished the debtor within reorganization was protected. The rationale
for this protection was that through reorganization the debtor could survive,' 7
repay his creditors,"I and provide continued employment for his employees."
With the enactment of the BRA, Congress retained the concept, 0 scope,'
and procedures 2 of the Act. Unfortunately, Congress perpetuated an importtant conflict between the Act and the NLRA.
Whereas the NLRA affords collective bargaining agreements manditory
procedural protections," the Bankruptcy Laws are not so protective. The BRA,
with one exception,"4 treats all collective bargaining agreements as executory
contracts in general and thus affords them no special protection."
'U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8.

"Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed, 2 Stat. 248 (1803); Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed,
5 Stat. 614 (1843); Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517 (1867); repealed, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
"30 Stat. 544-565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1080 (Superseded).
"'See generally, A. NAMDAR, supra note 37.
"1d.§ 1.2 at 7. Some rehabilitation was provided for individual debtors, and small corporations with
no secured debts, but no comprehensive rehabilitation as yet existed.
"Pub. L. No. 575, 52 Stat. 840-940 (1938) (Superseded).
"In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 894 (11th Cir. 1983).
"See, D.

STANLEY AND

M.

GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM

49H. R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong.,

IstSess. 220 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.

(1971).
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

5787, 5963, 6179.
"The policy of reoganization is to enable a debtor to rehabilitate himself and give him a fresh start. See,
H. R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977). See generally, Note, Resolution of Rejected Collective
BargainingAgreement Claims in Bankruptcy: Which Forum is Appropriate?, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 75
(1981).
"Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, reorganization was dealt with in four different chapters. Note, The
Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective BargainingAgreements, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 392 n.6 (1981).
The scope of reorganization has continued under the BRA but has been simplified by being consolidated

into one chapter, E.g., Chapter 11.
"Under the Act, executory contracts were dealt with in various sections such as 70b, 77b, 82b, 116(1),

216(4), 238b, 313(1), 357(2), 413(1), 461(4), 613(1) and 646(6). 9A Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 517 (1980).
The BRA has simplified this treatment by allowing for rejection of executory contracts primarily under
11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982) and secondarily under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2) (1982).

"See generally supra note 32.
"11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982). See supra note 14.
"11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982). See supra note 35.
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Under the BRA reorganization may be instituted by a voluntary

involuntary

7

petition. The

trustee"8

or debtor-in-possession

59

6

or

may then reject

60
or assume any executory contract subject to court approval. Thereafter, the
6
debtor-in-possession submits for court approval a reorganization plan. ' As
part of the plan the debtor-in-possession may reject or accept executory con-

tracts not previously acted upon.

2

63
The statutory provisions allowing for rejection are very broad. There

is no requirement in the BRA of compliance with the procedures of existing
and conflicting legislation.
Though case law as early as 193564 demonstrated the dilemma's existence,
Congress failed to correct the situation in enacting the BRA. There are con-

flicting views as to whether this congressional inaction was intentional or
inadvertant 5

As a result the federal courts have been left with the burden of reconciling two equally important and equally conflicting federal acts. Yet even the
courts have been unable to uniformly resolve this perplexing conflict.
II.

RECONCILING THE DILEMMA

A. Collective BargainingAgreements as Executory Contracts

Under state law an executory contract may be defined as "a contract that

66
has not yet been fully completed or performed." Thus, any contract in which
some performance is due from either side is considered to be executory.

It has been suggested that an executory contract under the Bankruptcy

7
Laws has a different and more limited meaning than under state law. Under
5611 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).

I'll U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
U.S.C. § 323 (1982). The trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding is one who is the representative of the
"I11
estate and who in such capacity can sue and in turn be sued.
5111 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982). In Chapter 11,where the debtor remains in possession and continues to operate
the business, he is deemed a debtor-in-possession. The debtor-in-possession has the same rights and duties
as the trustee, except that he is not entitled to compensation.
"11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
6111 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982).

6211 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2) (1982).
"Rejection under § 1123(b)(2) (1982) is only restricted by the requisites of § 365 which in turn limits rejection
or assumption to court approval.
"In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
"See Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective BargainingAgreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV.391,
396 (1981); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 365.02 (15th ed. 1983). But see, In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
6"BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). Professor Williston suggests, "all contracts to a greater or less
extent are executory. When they cease to be so they cease to be contracts." 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 14 (3d ed. 1957).
"12 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1 365.01(2) (15th ed. 1983).
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the Bankruptcy Laws it is not the rationale that some performance is due which
makes the contract subject to rejection, but whether the contract will impose
a burden upon the estate and deter rehabilitation. 8
Whether a collective bargaining agreement is viewed as an uncompleted
contract or a burdensome contract, it still falls within the definition of an
executory contract. The issue is whether a collective bargaining agreement is
the type of executory contract subject to rejection under the Bankruptcy Laws
when read in conjunction with the NLRA.
B. The "New Entity" View
The first case in which a federal circuit court had to decide whether collective bargaining agreements are subject to special protection or general reNLRA was Shopmen's Local Union
jection through bankruptcy according to 6the
9
No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.
Kevin involved a situation where a debtor-in-possession had filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter XI. " The debtor-in-possession sought
court approval to reject a collective bargaining agreement entered into prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 7' The bankruptcy court approved the
rejection, but on appeal to the district court the rejection was denied.72 At the
circuit court level, both the debtor-in-possession" and the union"' articulated
persuasive arguments. In the end the circuit court agreed with the debtor-in6'See, A. NAMDAR, supra note 37. Rejection of executory contracts is derived from the judicial doctrine
of abandonment where the contract was viewed as burdensome property and was thus, "abandoned".
6519 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975). Accord, Local Joint Executive Board AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc.,
613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
'0519 F.2d 698, 700 (2nd Cir. 1975).
"Id. The debtor-in-possession only sought the rejection of one of three existing collective bargaining
agreements.
"Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See,

A.

NAMDAR,

supra note 37.

"519 F. 2d 698 at 701-702. The debtor-in-possession set forth the following arguments:
(1) § 313(1) is phrased in broad terms and does not exclude collective bargaining agreements
from its scope.
(2) Prior case law of the district court level, upholds contention that collective bargaining
agreements are executory contracts and subject to rejection. See, Carpenter's Local 2746 v. Turney
Wood Products, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Overseas National Airways, Inc.,
238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Kabler Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
(3) If Congress had wanted to carve out an exception, it could easily have done so as it did
in Section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (Former analogous section
to 11 U.S.C. § 1167, which exempts collective bargaining agreements subject to the Railway Labor
Act).
"519 F. 2d at 702. The union, desiring that collective bargaining agreements be given special treatment
within bankruptcy presented the following arguments:
(1) What case law exists, is only district court opinions and thus not controlling on the circuit
court.
(2) U.S. Supreme Court decisions have held that collective bargaining agreements are not
ordinary contracts, therefore, the court here should not treat them as such. See, John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
(3) To allow rejection of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy, would permit employers
to circumvent the policy of the NLRA and would thus encourage employers to use the Bankruptcy
Laws as a means of avoiding undesirable collective bargaining agreements.
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possession's contention that collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts within the scope of the Act and are, therefore, subject to rejection.75
The Kevin court allowed rejection reasoning that congressional failure to
expressly exempt all collective bargaining agreements from the scope of the
Bankruptcy Laws was not legislative oversight.7 6 Secondly, Supreme Court
decisions that favored collective bargaining agreements in one context did not
protect them in the bankruptcy context." Thirdly, as to encouraging businesses
to seek refuge from collective bargaining agreements through bankruptcy, the
court held that "the adverse consequences of bankruptcy are ordinarily far
78
too harsh for that."

In order to reconcile the dilemma between the Act and the NLRA, the
Kevin court put forth what it called the "New Entity" theory.79 This theory
stated that the debtor-in-possession and the original debtor, who was a signator
to the collective bargaining agreement, were not the same person."0 The basis
for this conclusion was that the debtor-in-possession is under the supervision
of the court, whereas the original debtor is not.81 Furthermore, the debtor-inpossession should not be in any worse position than a successor employer who
can generally reject an existing collective bargaining agreement.82
The Kevin court thus held that "until the [debtor-in-possession] ... assumes
the old agreement or makes a new one, [he] is not a 'party' under section 8(d)
to any labor agreement with the union and is simply not subject to the termination restrictions of the section." 8 3 By the use of a legal fiction," the Kevin
court was able to reconcile the co-existence of two conflicting federal statutes.

7519 F. 2d at 706.

7"Id. at 705. The court listed several opportunities that Congress had to reform the existing Bankruptcy
Act, yet failed to do so, regarding collective bargaining agreements. E.g., Act of July 1, 1946, 60 Stat.
409; Act of Sept. 25, 1962, 76 Stat. 570; Acts of Nov. 28, 1967, 81 Stat. 510, 511, 516; Act of Oct. 1970,
84 Stat. 990. This argument is even more persuasive since the enactment of the BRA which was a
comprehensive reform statute.
71519 F. 2d at 703; U.S. v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959). (Fringe benefits, though considered
wages under the NLRA, are not wages under the Bankruptcy Act).
"519 F. 2d at 706. It is interesting to note that the adverse consequences of bankruptcy should be weighed
against the adverse consequences of the collective bargaining agreement that is sought to be avoided. See
generally, Hide and Seek: Bankruptcy in America, 287 ECONOMIST 102 (1983); Asbestos Litigation Group
ChallengesManville, 19 Trial 8 (1983).
"519 F. 2d at 704; See generally, Note, Bankruptcy and the Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1981); Note, The Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy: Rejection and
its Consequences, 36 ARK. L. REV. 469 (1983).
"0519 F. 2d at 704.
"Id.

"Id., NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), (Successor employer is
not bound by an existing contract. Rationale is to encourage the free flow of capital).
"519 F. 2d at 704, refering to 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) which is set out supra note 32.
"Note, Bankruptcy and the Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 819,
829 (1976).
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C. The "Legislative Intent" View
The second theory which justified rather than reconciled the dilemma between the Bankruptcy Law and the Labor Law is the "Legislative Intent"
theory.85 This theory finds its origin in In re BradaMiller FreightSystem, Inc.86
Brada dealt with a financially distressed trucking company that filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the BRA. 7 The debtor-in-possession sought
and obtained court approval to reject its collective bargaining agreements with
the union. 8 The debtor-in-possession negotiated new collective bargaining
9
agreements with most of its locals, but a few refused to bargain. Instead,
the non-bargaining locals appealed the bankruptcy court-approved rejection
arguing that collective bargaining agreements were excluded from the coverage
of section 365(a) of the BRA. 90 The unions' argument was consistently rejected
by both the district and circuit courts.
In reaching its decision the Brada court relied entirely on legislative intent
and criticized and rejected the "New Entity" theory. To justify its decision the
court looked to cases decided under the Act. The court noted that even case
law decided under the Act was relevant to the resolution of the Bankruptcy/Labor Law dilemma. 9'
The Brada court stated "that Congress intended collective bargaining
agreements to be subject to unilateral rejection by the bankruptcy trustee (with
the approval of the court) under section 365. " 92 The Brada court based its
holding on three factors that indicated a congressional intent that collective
bargaining agreements should not be exempt from the scope of the Bankruptcy
Laws. First, the court looked to the language of section 365. Here the court
could not find, nor did the union present, any evidence that collective bargaining
agreements were not within the scope of section 365. 93 The court, realizing that
statutory language does not always express legislative intent, did not end its
analysis but looked further.
Second, the Brada court looked to section 1167 of the BRA, which expressly and unambiguously excludes collective bargaining agreements subject

"The author uses this term to facilitate an analysis of the Brada court's holding.
6702 F. 2d 890 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 892.
"Id.
9Id.
90M.

"The court held that "[t]he (BRA's) reorganization provisions... (were) identical to § 313 of the Bankruptcy
Act (11 U.S.C. § 713) (replaced). Therefore, prior case law considering the relationship of § 313 and the
NLRA is relevant to our disposition of this case." 702 F. 2d at 894.
"1702 F. 2d at 894.
"Id. at 896.
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to the Railway Labor Act, 4 from the scope of section 365.11 Here the Brada
court agreed with the Kevin court whom they quoted as saying: "Congress
knew how to remove labor agreements from the scope of a general power to
reject executory contracts." 6 Therefore, congressional inaction must have been
intentional. Closely aligned with the aforementioned reason was the fact that
Congress had numerous opportunities to correct the dilemma but had failed
to do so."
Third, the Brada court looked to the rehabilitative purpose of the
reorganization provisions. 9" The court reasoned that rehabilitation could not
succeed if a collective bargaining agreement could never be rejected regardless
of its onerous or burdensome nature. The Brada court did not believe that Congress intended that collective bargaining agreements should have such a "strangle
hold" over the purposes of the BRA reorganization provisions. 9
The Brada court relied entirely on legislative intent and refused to lend
support to the "New Entity" theory. The court, like some commentators,'
believed that the "New Entity" theory was hindered by conceptual inconsistencies which did not reconcile the dilemma as efficiently as the Kevin court
had believed.' 0
Two concepts were especially troublesome to the Brada court. First, the
Brada court noted that section 365 requires court approval prior to rejection
of an executory contract. 02 This requisite indicated that Congress did not view
the debtor-in-possession as a different person or new entity. 0' 3 The Bradacourt
reasoned that had Congress intended the debtor-in-possession to be a new entity
the statutory scheme would have allowed for automatic rejection of all executory
contracts simply upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 0 4
Second, the Brada court looked at the situation where a debtor-inpossession chose to accept the executory contract. 0 5 The court could not understand how a "New Entity," who was not previously a party to an agreement
9445 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1976).
"1702 F. 2d at 896.
"Id. at 896, Citing, Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F. 2d 698, 704
(2nd Cir. 1975).
"1702 F. 2d at 896; See also supra note 76.
"1702 F. .2d at 896.
"Id.
'Countryman Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 11, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974). Note, The
Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective BargainingAgreement, 80 MICH. L. REV.
134 (1981).
"'1702 F. 2d at 895.
11Id. Contra, NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
'0702 F.2d at 895.
104Id.
'Id.
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could, by acceptance, bind himself retroactively to a time when he, in fact,
did not exist.

06

D. Analysis
Both the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit reached the same result.
These circuits held that collective bargaining agreements are subject to rejection under the Bankruptcy Laws. Each circuit, though, has reached this result
through different means.
It is true, as pointed out in Bradathat the "New Entity" theory has conceptual flaws. Regardless of such flaws, the "New Entity" theory does reconcile the dilemma between the Bankruptcy Law and the Labor Law. The Second
Circuit refused to ignore existence of the dilemma. Instead, the Second Circuit admitted the existence of a legislative conflict and chose to put forth a
theory which reconciled and diminished this conflict.
The difficulty with the Eleventh Circuit's "Legislative Intent" theory is
that the dilemma is avoided. The Eleventh Circuit's response appears to be
more of a justification than a reconciliation. The "Legislative Intent" theory
appears to be a "that's the way life is" response, and that no reconciliation
is needed. The prevailing view is the "New Entity" view, which is followed
in three circuits. 0 7 The Eleventh'0 8 Circuit alone follows the "Legislative Intent" view.
As has been shown, regardless of which view is followed, collective bargaining agreements are not absolutely immune from rejection under the BRA. Not
one of the four circuits that has confronted the dilemma has been able to glean
any protective treatment from the Bankruptcy Laws.
III.

THE STANDARD FOR REJECTION

A. Minimal Scrutiny
As to non-collective bargaining agreements, the prevailing standard for
review is the "business judgment test."'0 9 This test is a very deferential and
subjective test, whereby rejection is permitted whenever it will result in a benefit
to the estate. The rationale for the business judgment test is that the debtor's
estate should be free to abandon any burdensome property.I 0
"''Id.But see, Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F. 2d 312, 320 (2d Cir. 1975).
cert. denied 439 U.S. 825. (The court explained that the "New Entity" "cannot be taken literally, since
neither affirmance nor rejection of the collective bargaining agreement would be possible by one not a
party to it.") E.g., Local Joint Executive Board AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F. 2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
"''Inre Bildisco, 682 F. 2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S..Ct. 1188 (1984); Local Joint Executive Board
AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F. 2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin
Steel Products, Inc., 519 F. 2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975).
"''Inre Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F. 2d 890 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
192 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY.
365.03 (15th ed. 1983); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
""°2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, 365.03
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The prevailing view has been to reject the business judgment test whenever
a collective bargaining agreement has been the focus of rejection.I' The rationale
for this reasoning is that the business judgment test "totally ignores the policies
' 2
of the Labor Act, and makes no attempt to accommodate to them." "1
Notwithstanding the prevailing view, some courts have applied the business
judgment test in deciding whether rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should be permitted.' 3 The courts that have expressly approved the
business judgment test do not include any circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit,
though, may have approved the test by its refusal to expressly reject it in Local
4
Joint Executive Board AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc.I"
In Hotel Circlea debtor-in-possession under Chapter XI of the Act wished
to sell the estate."I5 The debtor-in-possession located a buyer who would consumate the sale only upon the rejection of the estate's collective bargaining
agreements." ' , The bankruptcy court permitted the rejection based on the
business judgment test, and the district court affirmed." 7 On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, the district court decision was affirmed, but the circuit court
failed to discuss whether the standard applied by the bankruptcy court was
proper." 8 One can reason that, by implication, the Ninth Circuit has given
judicial approval to the applicability of the business judgment test in the case
of collective bargaining agreements.
B. Strict Scrutiny
The strict scrutiny test is a two pronged test that was formulated by the
Second Circuit in Shopmen 's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,
Inc.' ' The Second Circuit believed that a defferential test, such as the business
judgment test, ignored the policies of, and the conflict between, the Act and
the NLRA.' 2 0 Furthermore, the Kevin court agreed with the union's assertions
2
that a potential for abuse existed and that such potential should be minimized.' '
"'In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F. 2d 890 (1 1th Cir. 1983); E.g., Shopmen's Local Union
No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F. 2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975).
"'Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F. 2d 698, 707 (2nd Cir. 1975).
"3In re Ateco Equipment, Inc., 18 Bankr. 915 (W.D. Pa. 1982); In re Klaber Brothers, Inc., 173 F. Supp.
83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
14613 F. 2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
"1'Id. at 212.
116id.
1"'419 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
'613 F. 2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
"9519 F. 2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975); See also, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA
Express, Inc., 523 F. 2d 164 (2nd Cir. 1975), Cert. denied 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
1"0519 F. 2d at 707.
"'Id. The stipulated facts proved that the debtor-in-possession acted in bad faith by discriminatorally
laying off union workers and refusing to bargain and sign any new collective bargaining agreements. The
union asserted that prior to rejection the:
Judge should have required, among other things, a showing that the employer is not improperly
motivated merely by a desire to rid itself of the union and its adherents, more convincing proof
of the company's financial condition, the source of its difficulties and the benefit to be gained12
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss4/14
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The Kevin court stated that rejection should be permitted
only after a thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities
on both sides, for, in relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the employees affected
of their seniority, welfare and pension rights, as well as other valuable
benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a provable claim for
money damages.' 2 2
What the equities were, though, the court failed to say. The balancing of the
equities constituted the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.
The Second Circuit did not formulate the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test until one month later in Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
Clerks vs. REA Express, Inc. 23 REA dealt with a debtor-in-possession who was
subject to the requisites of the Railway Labor Act. 124 The REA court, regarding rejection stated that "it should be authorized only where it clearly appears
to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the [debtorin-possession] will collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." 125
A two prong test of strict scrutiny has thus evolved. The first prong requires
a threshold showing that without rejection of the collective bargaining agreement the reorganization will fail and the debtor-in-possession will have to
liquidate. If the debtor satisfies the first prong, the court must then balance
the equities and determine if rejection is still permitted. Again the Second Circuit failed to set forth any factors to be considered in balancing the equities,
26
leaving such to lower court interpretation.'
C. Intermediate Scrutiny
The standard of intermediate scrutiny originated in In re Bildisco.12' Bildisco
dealt with a building supply distributor who filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the BRA.' 28 The debtor-in-possession requested and received permission to reject its collective bargaining agreement with eighteen
by rejecting the contract, and a careful weighing of the equities against rejection, including the
loss of intangible employee rights.
Contra,52 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1983) (No. 82-818, No. 82-852) (Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence
G. Wallace stated that collective bargaining agreements should be treated as executory contracts in general
and discounted the importance of bad faith).
"'1519 F. 2d 698, quoting, In re Overseas National Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D. N.Y. 1965).
12523 F. 2d 164 (2nd Cir. 1975). cert. denied 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
"'245 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1976). See supra note 14.
12'523 F. 2d at 172.
"'In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
First, the court should determine that the agreement is onerous and burdensome to the estate, so
that failure to reject will make a successful arrangement impossible. Second, the equities must be
balanced and found to favor the debtor. Then and only then, may rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement be permitted.
'2682 F. 2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); Accord, In re Brada Miller Freight System,
Inc., 702 F. 2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983).
"'682 F. 2d 72.
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employees. '29
On appeal, the Third Circuit questioned the proper standard for rejecting
collective bargaining agreements. The court agreed that a stricter standard than
the business judgment test was required.' 30 The court refused however to lend
support to the strict two prong test that the court called not the test of Kevin,
but rather the test of Kevin's "illegitimate progeny."' 3 '
The Bildisco court gave two important reasons for rejecting the strict
scrutiny standard. First, it may not be possible, at the time rejection is requested,
to determine if reorganization will fail without the rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement. 32 Second, a strict standard "unduly exalts the perpetuation of the collective bargaining agreement over the more pragmatic consideration of whether the employees will continue to have jobs at all."' 33
The test of intermediate scrutiny is a two prong test just as in strict scrutiny.
The difference in intermediate scrutiny is the requisite first prong. First, the
debtor-in-possession must "demonstrate that the continuation of the collecThe debtortive bargaining agreement would be burdensome to the estate."
in-possession need not show that reorganization will fail without rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement. The second prong is similar to strict scrutiny.
The debtor-in-possession must demonstrate that the equities favor rejection.' 3 5
Though the Bildisco court did not expressly list what equities were to be considered, the court did say that a reviewing "court must consider the rights of
covered employees as supported by the national labor policy as well as the possible 'sacrifices which other creditors are making' in the effort to bring about
a successful reorganization."' 36 Thus the test of intermediate scrutiny treats
the policies of the NLRA and the BRA equally.
IV:

THE SUPREME COURT VIEW

A. Affirmance of the "Legislative Intent" View
On February 22, 1984 the United States Supreme Court finally addressed
the judicial inconsistencies concerning the NLRA/BRA legislative dilemma. 3 7
In Part Two of a unanimous opinion, Justice William Rehnquist addressed
two important issues.
" Id. At the time of the hearing, the number of employees had been reduced to three.
"Id
"'Id.
The Bildisco court believed that the two prong Kevin test was a test of intermediate scrutiny that
had been converted into strict scrutiny by REA Express. The Bildisco court believed that REA Express
did not restate the two prong test, as REA said it had, but rather, reformulated it into a sticter standard.
"'Id. at 80.

133Id
1"'Id.
'Id.
"'Id. at 81.
"'NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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The first issue addressed was whether a collective bargaining agreement
that is protected by the NLRA is subject to rejection under the BRA. '38 The
Supreme Court answered this issue in the affirmative. Though the Supreme
Court's result was consistent with the result reached by all the circuit courts,
the Supreme Court's ratio decidendi was not.
In resolving the first issue Justice Rehnquist relied entirely upon the
"Legislative Intent" view. The Supreme Court, refering to the text of the
BRA,' 13 9 found both express and implied legislative intent that collective
bargaining agreements under the NLRA were not to be afforded absolute protection under the BRA.
The Supreme Court found express legislative intent in the text of section
365(a) and noted that express limitations' ° did exist as to the debtor-inpossession's power to reject executory contracts. The Supreme Court stated
that "none of the express limitations on the debtor-in-possession's general power
under § 365(a) apply to collective bargaining agreements."'4 1 Thus, the Supreme
Court, relying on a maxim of statutory construction,' found express legislative
intent, that collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA are not absolutely
protected by the BRA.
Next the Supreme Court looked at the text of section 11671'1 and found
implied legislative intent that collective bargaining agreements in general, are
not exempt from BRA rejection. Relying on section 1167 the Supreme Court
held; "Obviously, Congress knew how to draft an exclusion for collectivebargaining agreements when it wanted to; its failure to do so in this instance
indicates that Congress intended that § 365(a) apply to all collective-bargaining
agreements covered by the NLRA.""'
By not expressly accepting the "New Entity" view the Supreme Court has
impliedly rejected it. Although a similar result would have occurred under either
view, the Supreme Court's reliance solely on legislative intent indicates that
the Court declined to make an attempt to reconcile the NLRA/BRA dilemma. "
B. Qualified Intermediate Scrutiny
The main issue in Part Two of the opinion was: What is the standard for
"'Id. at 1189.

1'Id.
"'Id., referring to the statutory language of 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) which qualifies rejection in
circumstances covered by 11 U.S.C. § 365(b), (c), and (d) (1982) and 11 U.S.C. § 765 and 766 (1982).
"104 S. Ct. at 1189.
' 2 E.

BODENHEIMER, J. OAKLEY & J. LovE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
READINGS AND CASES (1980). Referring to Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Expression of one thing

means exclusion of another thing).
"'104 S. Ct. 1188.
"'Id. at 1189.
"'See supra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
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the rejection of collective bargaining agreements? 1' The Supreme Court
admitted that a standard greater than the business judgment test was required, 7
but refused to accept a standard as great as that of strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court rejected the strict scrutiny test because it was "fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility" ' 8 found in the BRA reorganization provisions. Instead of considering the interests of all persons such as the
debtor, creditors and employees a strict scrutiny test would focus primarily
upon the interests of the employees and could possibly frustrate a successful
reorganization.
The Supreme Court instead accepted what appeared to be the test of intermediate scrutiny.' 9 The Supreme Court held that a collective bargaining agreement can be rejected when the agreement "burdens the estate, and that after
careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract."' s
Although facially adopting the test of intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme
Court in reality formulated a new standard that limited the "balancing of
equities" prong of the intermediate scrutiny test. The Supreme Court noted
that the interests of all affected parties are to be considered and balanced, but
the Court added that "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not authorize free-wheeling
consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities relate
to the success of the reorganization."'I' Accordingly, although intermediate
scrutiny treats the goals of the NLRA and the BRA equally, qualified intermediate scrutiny tends to favor the BRA.'5 2 The Supreme Court's favored treatment of the BRA further aggravates the NLRA/BRA dilemma instead of
attempting to minimize it.
CONCLUSION

If Congress truly intends that collective bargaining agreements should be
exempt from rejection under the BRA, Congress should expressly so provide
in future bankruptcy reforms. Absolute exemption will eliminate the legislative
dilemma that presently exists. Absolute exemption will also eliminate the abuse
by employers who merely seek bankruptcy court refuge as a means of avoiding

1'104 S. Ct. at 1189.
'471d. at 1191.
'"Id.
"'Id.Though the Supreme Court did not classify the standard as intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court
held that it followed the view articulated in In re Bildisco, 682 F. 2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982) and In re Brada
Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F. 2d 890 (1lth Cir. 1983).
"'0104 S. Ct. at 1191 (1984).
"'Id. at 1192.
"'The term "qualified intermediate scrutiny" is used by the author in order to indicate that a conceptual
difference does exist between the two tests. For example, whereas intermediate scrutiny treats the NLRA
and the BRA equally, qualified intermediate scrutiny tends to favor the policies of the BRA over those
of the NLRA.
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their collective bargaining agreements.'"
Congress must realize, however, that absolute exemption is a two-edged
sword that may result in the complete frustration of the BRA reorganization
provisions. While absolute exemption will deter a wrongfully motivated
employer, it will also deter a good-faith employer who, with the aid of the
BRA, could survive and continue to provide his employees with needed
employment.
There are two alternatives through which Congress can enact legislative
reform without unduly frustrating the policies of the BRA and the NLRA.
First, Congress can incorporate the intermediate scrutiny test' 54 into the statutory
scheme of the BRA. The intermediate scrutiny test considers the existence and
the purposes of both the BRA and the NLRA without undue favoritism. In
order to insure incorporation of such a test and thus an equality of treatment,
the statutory scheme should require the reviewing courts to look at various
factors. 1
The courts should look to the possibility of liquidation. If the debtor-inpossession is very near to financial collapse, rejection should be permitted in
an effort to deter default and thus provide continued employment. In some
situations this factor alone may be determinative of whether rejection should
be permitted. If possible, though, scrutiny should not end here but should continue on to consider other factors of equal importance.
A second factor to look to is the wages of employees in similarly situated
industries. For example, if the debtor-in-possession is an automaker, look to
the wages paid by other automakers. This factor will deter an employer who
is seeking reorganization merely as a means of avoiding what he believes to
be a burdensome collective bargaining agreement. The burden of justifying rejection is upon the proponent. This burden will be difficult to justify when
it is found that the debtor-in-possession is paying his employees as much, or
even less than the industry norm.
Third, the courts should look to whether the burdens of reorganization
are equally distributed. Here the courts should look to whether all employees
are sharing in the loss or merely the unionized employees.' 5 6 Furthermore, is
"'In re David A. Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190 (D. Conn. 1981). (Employer was denied rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement that would have resulted in savings of forty-one thousand dollars over a sixty-five
week period, while not attempting the rejection or modification of a lease from family members costing
fifteen thousand dollars per month). In re Figure Flattery, Inc., 88 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11,850 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
"'See supra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
"'Accord, In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F. 2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983).
"'In re Parrot Packing Co., Inc., 99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10,550 (N.D. Ind. 1983). (Union employees
had taken pay cuts and suffered lay-offs while at the same time management had received substantial
wage increases and a larger proportion of salaried personnel had been hired. The court held "it is simply
inequitable to force one group of employees to sustain a vastly disproportionate share of reductions when
others could share in that burden for the common good ... of the company,").
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the loss in wages evenly distributed? For example, is managment taking a ten
percent reduction in wages while labor is taking a forty percent reduction? In
this regard, the courts should look to all categories of losses including wages
and benefits. 1'7
Fourth, the courts should look at the impact of rejection upon similar
competitive industries. The rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by
one employer may result in a "domino effect" throughout a competitive industry. Rejection by one employer may have a detrimental effect upon the continued viability of a related employer.' For example, the airline industry is
highly competitive. Suppose through reorganization, one airline can substantially reduce its labor costs and in turn offer lower fares. If the debtor's competitors cannot reduce fares or reject existing collective bargaining agreements,
they may be at a competitive disadvantage, which may in time result in the competitor's financial demise. In the alternative, the competitor may obtain voluntary concessions from its employees, which will result in increased profits if
fares are not reduced or added competition for the original debtor-in-possession
if fares are reduced. In essence there could be a price war with the loser being
a competitor who could no longer reduce labor costs.
Lastly, the courts should look to the good faith efforts of the union and
the debtor-in-possession in their extrajudicial efforts to resolve their mutually
difficult situation. Here especially, the court can give support to the goals of
the NLRA. The courts should encourage a debtor-in-possession to attempt
renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement prior to seeking court
approved rejection.' 59
By closely scrutinizing the aforementioned factors, the courts will truly
be "balancing the equities." Futhermore, by looking at all equities and not
merely those that favor reorganization, the courts will truly be promoting the
important policies of both the NLRA and the BRA.
As an alternative to incorporation of the intermediate scrutiny test, Congress could reform the BRA and permit the temporary suspension of collective bargaining agreements. Temporary suspension is not to be confused with
partial rejection. 60 Through temporary suspension a collective bargaining agreement could be suspended for a statutory period.
After the termination of the statutory period, the court could reevaluate
...
In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F. 2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983). Some of the benefits of a collective
bargaining agreement are non-monetary and may not be recoverable since they cannot be reduced to a
dollar amount. For example; work rules or seniority rights.
"'In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 6 Bankr. 968 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Two competitors complained that
they would be financially ruined because their collective bargaining agreements could not be rejected and
they could thus not be competitive with the debtor-in-possession.
"'Accord, NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
1602 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcy, 365.01(1) (15th ed. 1983). The debtor-in-possession must completely accept
or reject the contract. He cannot merely reject the burdensome provisions and accept the beneficial ones.
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the circumstances of the debtor-in-possession. The court could then either mandate a continued suspension, a return to the original contract terms, or order
rejection and renegotiation.
This alternative would further the goals of reorganization by granting the
debtor-in-possession an opportunity to rehabilitate himself and financially survive. Temporary suspension would aid the unionized worker by deterring a
wrongfully motivated employer from seeking reorganization simply to avoid
a collective bargaining agreement.
Due to increased public concern, some type of legislative reform is
inevitable.' 61 Congress must proceed cautiously, however, so that the important policies of both the NLRA and the BRA are promoted instead of frustrated.

GUST GOUTRAS

"1605 LAB. L. REp. (CCH) No. 1299 at 3 (Oct. 14, 1983).
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